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Conceptualizing Metaethics
A Commentary on Prinz
Yann Wilhelm
In this commentary on Prinz’s “Naturalizing Metaethics” I shall first look briefly
at his methodological assumptions. I will argue that Prinz’s approach is more rad-
ical and less conciliatory between analytical and empirical approaches than it
seems from his own description. In the second part of my commentary, I shall look
at one possible objection to Prinz’s sentimentalism: the evidence he presents does
not provide the needed modal strength for sentimentalism. I shall present two ex-
ample of this objection, and argue that Prinz’s own depiction doesn’t adequately
represent it. I shall then use the helpful distinction offered by Jon Tresan between
de dicto- and de re-internalism to analyze underlying problems in the objection. I
will present another way of reacting to it, which I think fits nicely with Prinz’s
naturalized methodology. In the last part, I shall look at his critique of non-cog-
nitivism. Prinz argues that non-cognitivism makes certain linguistic  predictions
that turn out to be wrong: if non-cognitivism were true we would expect our moral
language to reflect this. I will argue that there are many forms of non-cognitivism
that predict this surface grammar. The key idea is that non-cognitivism entails a
pragmatic theory of moral language. I then offer a speculative explanation about
why the moral language has its surface form. This speculation, I argue, has at
least the same amount of plausibility as cognitivist theories. Furthermore, this
possible explanation is open to empirical investigation. I agree with Prinz that, ul-
timately, metaethical theories should be tested against empirical evidence. Prinz
presents conceptual and empirical work as mutually enhancing enterprises. My
commentary is, I hope, a small contribution highlighting the conceptual side of the
coin.
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1 Metaethics under empirical scrutiny
Prinz  proposes  to  naturalize  metaethics.
Metaethics is traditionally regarded as a second-
order discourse about ethics. Where normative
ethics asks what is good and what is bad, what
we should or shouldn’t do, metaethics asks the
question  of  what  morality  is  itself  (DeLapp
2011). Its subject is the ontology of moral prop-
erties, the semantics of moral discourse, the epi-
stemic foundation of moral judgments and the
psychology  of  moral  opinions.  These  different
aspects are highly interrelated—answers in one
area influence questions asked in others.
There are many different ways to tackle the
question of what morality itself actually is. Prinz
characterizes metaethics as being concerned with
the foundations of  moral  judgments (Prinz this
collection, p. 1). This is his starting point, which
shapes his decision tree. He acknowledges that one
could arrange the tree in different ways, depending
on which aspect one wants to pull into focus.
Prinz’s primary goal is to show that every
question in the decision tree is empirically tract-
able (this collection, p. 1). This is his methodo-
logical  naturalism (p.  2).1 He  argues  that  we
1 He contrasts this with metaphysical naturalism and semantic natur-
alism. The former says that everything there is belongs to the nat-
ural world. The latter tries to reduce concepts from various domains
in terms that are more likely to be naturalized in the metaphysical
sense.
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should study the domain of metaethics empiric-
ally. He wants to test “[...] theories derived from
philosophical reflection against the tribunal of
empirical evidence” (Prinz this collection, p. 5).
Metaethics,  according to him, is  not the
sole matter of  armchair reflection. This seems
natural when we characterize metaethics as the
question  of  what  morality  itself  is.  But  that
goes against the view that metaethics—or philo-
sophy in general—is not concerned with what
actually is the case, but with what must be the
case. What are the necessary conditions of mor-
ality?  On  this  view,  metaethics  is  concerned
with statements that hold a priori. Most of the
time this means deriving knowledge from reflec-
tion  upon the  meaning  of  our  concepts.  This
method of  conceptual analysis had been at the
core of philosophy since the analytic turn (Prinz
this collection, p. 3).
Against this turn Prinz sets the empirical
turn (this collection, p. 3). He describes this de-
velopment as an enrichment of the philosopher’s
tool box. Where conceptual considerations help
us to formulate theories and flesh out the differ-
ences between different views, empirical meth-
ods confirm the theories derived from this work.
The former pose questions and formulates pos-
sible  answers;  the  latter  test  those  answers.
Prinz emphasizes that empirical and traditional
approaches are not opposed to one another (this
collection, p. 5). Rather, they complement each
other. They’re more like opposing points on a
continuum of methods for exploring the world.
It is important to see that this view is not
as  conciliatory  between  traditional  analytic
philosophy and empirical philosophy as it might
seem. It does not leave room for  a priori arm-
chair reflection. In fact, Prinz even regards con-
ceptual analysis as an empirical task: “[A]rm-
chair conceptual analysis  can be characterized
as an introspective memory retrieval process. As
such, it can be regarded as a form of observa-
tion” (2008, p. 191).
When Prinz speaks of “traditional meth-
ods”, he does not include conceptual analysis as
an a priori enterprise. Rather, he is referring to
various tools, for example formal semantics or
logic,  which  help  us  articulate  theories.  They
are tools for exploring the natural world, from
which we gain knowledge only through experi-
ence. Prinz is a radical empiricist at heart.
An  empirical  scientist  could  ask:  “What
differentiates this from my own work?” For she,
too, reflects  upon different theories,  how they
relate to each other, formulates questions, and
so on. This is  an important part of scientific,
empirical work. I think Prinz would agree. An
important upshot of his naturalized philosophy
is that there are no clear-cut borders between
philosophy  and  psychology  (Prinz 2008,  pp.
204–206). They are different disciplines not be-
cause of their different subject areas or methods
but for  pragmatic  reasons.  They are  different
academic disciplines, shaped by sociological and
historical  processes.  The  borders  between  the
different disciplines become blurred in the em-
pirical turn. According to Prinz, this is a good
thing.
I think this the real strength of Prinz’s ap-
proach. Arguably many disciplines are divided
largely  by pragmatical  differences,  like  educa-
tion and academic organization. Instead of de-
marcating different approaches, instead of draw-
ing sharp lines  between them,  Prinz proposes
that we unite them in the search for explana-
tions of the natural world.
Prinz’s  target  article  is  a  very  good ex-
ample of this approach. Here I want to make a
few remarks in the spirit of Prinz’s own meth-
odology. In the next section I will focus on a
specific objection against Prinz’s answers to the
first question in the decision tree. I think that it
can clarify some consequences of his methodolo-
gical naturalism for metaethics.
2 Internalism and modal strength
In this section I discuss Prinz’s answer to a po-
tential objection to his sentimentalism, namely,
that the evidence lacks modal strength. In fact,
objections of this kind have already been raised
against  Prinz’s  and  other  naturalistic
metaethical theories already. I shall first argue
that his answer doesn’t get to the heart of the
objection.  Second,  I  propose  a  way  in  which
Prinz can and should answer it.  To do this I
shall present two instances where this objection
has  been  made.  A helpful  distinction  by  Jon
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Tresan will  then show that there are actually
two  kinds  of  internalist  theses  at  play  here.
Only one of these is really relevant for Prinz’s
naturalized metaethics, I shall argue. The objec-
tion then loses its force in light of Prinz’s pro-
ject of a naturalistic methodology. The following
reasoning can also be seen as a small case study
in recent (naturalized) metaethics.
The first question in Prinz’s decision tree
is whether moral judgments are essentially af-
fect-laden or not. This is Prinz’s take on the in-
ternalist-externalist  debate.2 This  debate  is  a
classical  debate  in  metaethics  that  can  be
traced  back to  the  British  moralists  (Darwall
1995). It concerns the question of whether mo-
tivation is  internal or  external to moral  judg-
ments. Do moral judgments necessarily involve
motivation to act accordingly? Or does the mo-
tivation  come from a desire  external  to  them
(e.g., the desire to be a good person)?3
Prinz  advocates  a  position  that  he  calls
sentimentalism:
Sentimentalism =Df Moral  Judgments  es-
sentially  involve  affective  states,  such  as
emotions, in one of two ways: such states
as  constituent  parts  of  moral  judgments
(traditional  sentimentalism);  or  moral
judgments are judgments about the appro-
priateness of such states (neo-sentimental-
ism). (Prinz this collection, p. 6)
The  evidence  for  a  link  between  moral  judg-
ments and emotions is overwhelming (Prinz this
collection, p. 10). But is it enough to warrant a
stronger  relation  than  mere  accompaniment?
Even if we grant Prinz the interpretation that
affective states are not only mere  consequences
of moral judgments, could we not still question
whether they are essential components of moral
judgments? The objection is this: the empirical
evidence lacks  modal strength to support senti-
2 Although he doesn’t explicitly put it like this, I think it’s safe to
frame it in this way. The option that denies affect-ladeness is called
“externalist moral realism”, and he states in various places that emo-
tions are motivating or action-guiding (Prinz this collection, pp. 8,
11, 21). And one answer to the third question is a position called “in-
ternal realism”. What I say about internalism in the following there-
fore applies equally to Prinz’s sentimentalism. See also Prinz (2006),
where he explicitly states motivational internalism.
3 See Björklund et al. (2012) for a short overview.
mentalism. Even if all our ordinary moral judg-
ments are based on emotions, it could still be
possible to judge dispassionately (Prinz this col-
lection, p. 13). Therefore the evidence doesn’t
support sentimentalism.
Prinz answers that the empirical evidence
gives us enough reason to infer that we cannot
make  moral  judgments  without  emotions:
“Every study suggests that emotions arise when
we  make  moral  judgments.  All  evidence  also
suggests  that  when  emotions  are  eliminated,
judgments  subside as  well”  (Prinz this  collec-
tion, p. 13).
According to  Prinz, the theory that emo-
tions are  essential  components of  moral  judg-
ments explains the total pattern of data better
than its rivals (this collection, p. 14). Further-
more, he argues that the sentimentalist can ac-
cept psychologically exotic cases, in which the
connection between moral judgments and emo-
tions doesn’t occur, which conform rival theor-
ies.
This answer, I argue, misses the real core
of the objection. Prinz confronts it upfront and
just states what it questions. He puts the objec-
tion in the following way:
The evidence shows that emotions are of-
ten  consulted  when  making  moral  judg-
ments, but this leaves open the possibility
that we might also make moral judgments
dispassionately  under  circumstances  that
have  not  yet  been  empirically  explored.
(Prinz this collection, p. 13)
But this does not represent the objection ad-
equately. The objection doesn’t rest on possible,
not-yet-found empirical evidence against senti-
mentalism. Rather,  it  rests  on opposing  ideas
about  what  kind  of  modal  strength  claims
about  the  relation  between  moral  judgments
and emotions should possess.  At the heart of
this  objection there  is  no  disagreement  about
the empirical evidence, but an opposition in the
underlying methodology.
Adina Roskies, for example, accepts that
“[…]  those  [brain]  areas  involved  in  moral
judgments  normally  send  their  output  to
areas involved in affect, resulting in motives
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that in some instances cause us to act” (2008,
p. 192).
But she thinks that this is not enough for
internalism to be true.4 In her view there is a
connection between the cognitive and the affect-
ive  system,  but  “this  link  is  causal  and  thus
contingent and not constitutive” (Roskies 2008,
p. 192). In this sense the connection, according
to her, is not necessary.
Antti  Kauppinen  sees  the  difference
between internalism and externalism in a sim-
ilar way. He depicts internalism as saying that
there  is  a  link  between moral  judgments  and
motivation that holds a priori and with concep-
tual  necessity.  externalism,  in  contrast,  is  the
view that this link is contingent and a posteriori
(Kauppinen 2008, p. 3). For Kauppinen, every
internalist position then becomes an externalist
position if it weakens the modality of the claim.
When a metaethical account doesn’t claim that
the  connection  between  moral  judgments  and
motivation holds a priori and by necessity, it is
an externalist account. No amount of empirical
data can refute this criticism.
In Kauppinen’s case the disagreement with
Prinz  about  the  underlying  methodology  is
clear.  He  reacts  to  the  proposal  by  Roskies,
Prinz, and Alfred Mele (among others) that we
clarify the debate empirically (Kauppinen 2008,
4). Because of his definitions of internalism and
externalism as  conceptual  necessary claims he
argues that “[...] findings in either actual or fic-
tional experimental psychology or neuroscience
have little relevance to the debate” (Kauppinen
2008, p. 4).
Kauppinen is  opposed  to  methodological
naturalism  in  philosophical  moral  psychology
(2008, p. 4). That is why he would not be satis-
fied  with  Prinz’s  answer  to  this  objection.
Against  him,  Prinz  would  have  to defend his
metaethical  naturalism.  Interestingly  enough,
Roskies, on the other hand, thinks that we can
clarify metaethical debates empirically.
In what follows I shall show how I think
Prinz should meet this objection. Furthermore,
4 Her critique is directed at internalism, not sentimentalism. But I re-
gard both positions as similar enough to treat Roskies’s critique as
an argument against Prinz’s sentimentalism (see also above). At the
core of both positions is  the connection between moral judgments
and affective (motivational) states.
I will argue that everyone who wants to apply
empirical data to metaethical debates, such as,
e.g., Adina Roskies, should side with Prinz on
his methodological naturalism and accept inter-
nalism as a true a posteriori theory about moral
judgments.
I will now present an analysis of the inter-
nalism–externalism  debate  offered  by  Jon
Tresan that  I  think will  be  very helpful  here
(2009).  He distinguishes  different  formulations
of  internalism  along  various  dimensions.  He
claims  that  a  very  important  distinction  has
been overlooked: most philosophers in the de-
bate neglected the difference between the mod-
ality of the internalist claim and the stated rela-
tion  between  moral  opinions  and  motivation.
According  to  Tresan,  there  are  two  different
kinds of necessity that can occur in such claims:
wide-scope  necessity,  which  operates  over  the
entire proposition—de dicto—and narrow-scope
necessity, which operates over the predicate—de
re (Tresan 2009, p. 54). The first operates on
the dimension of  Modality and the second on
the dimension of Relation (Tresan 2009, p. 55).
For  example,  the  statement that  parents
have  children  can  be  formulated  with  both
kinds of necessities:
Necessarily,  parents  have  children  (de
dicto).
Parents have, necessarily, children (de re).
In the first case the proposition that parents
have children is stated as holding necessarily.
Parents  have  children,  otherwise  they  would
not be called parents. If someone has a child,
she is a parent. But the second statement says
that  people  who are  parents  have  their  kids
necessarily.  But  this  is  obviously  false.  John
and Mary don’t have their children necessar-
ily. They could easily never have had any chil-
dren  at  all.  True,  they  would  not,  then,  be
parents – but the fact that they are parents
may have, initially, been quite accidental. We
can  easily  see  that  there  is  a  difference
between  de  dicto-  and  de  re-necessities  be-
cause these two statements can have different
truth-values at the same time.
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With this distinction at hand we can dis-
tinguish two different internalist theses: a strong
Modality/weak Relation or de dicto-internalism,
and a weak Modality/strong Relation or de re-
internalism. The former states that, with neces-
sity, there is a connection between moral judg-
ments  and  motivation.  The  latter  says  that
there is  a necessary connection between these
two things.
Tresan uses this distinction to argue that
something has gone fundamentally wrong in the
internalism–externalism debate. The neglect of
the two features has led to the  internalist fal-
lacy: the strength in Modality of an internalist
claim  was  taken  to  be  strength  in  Relation,
which led to an overestimation of the epistemic
value  of  the  claim (Tresan 2009,  p.  55).  The
classical debate stated the connection between
moral  judgments  and  motivation  in  terms  of
conceptual  necessity  (a  de  dicto-internalism)
(see  Roskies’s  and  Kauppinen’s  accounts
above). Arguments for this claim were supposed
to evoke the intuition that no one can make a
moral judgment without being motivated to act.
If  we have such intuitions,  the arguments go,
the connection is a conceptual necessity. Like-
wise,  arguments  against  this  internalist  claim
consisted in thought experiments that were sup-
posed to evoke contrary intuitions.
From  Tresan’s  distinction  follows  that
claims with de dicto necessity are claims about
our concepts and not about the subject matter
(2009, p. 57).  De dicto-internalism, then,  is  a
claim about our concept “moral judgment” and
de  re-internalism  a  claim  about  the  subject
matter—the phenomenon of moral judgments.
Returning to Prinz (and to Roskies’s pro-
posal), we can now see that there are really two
empirical questions we can ask: First, what is
our concept of “moral judgment”? And second,
what  are  moral  judgments?  Traditionally  the
first was not regarded as an empirical question.
Philosophers probed their intuitions and just as-
sumed that others shared them. Prinz, on the
other hand, regards these kinds of questions as
empirical in nature and presents his own survey
studies that probes folk intuitions. He concludes
that  most people do consider  emotions neces-
sary for moral judgments (Prinz this collection,
p. 10; for other  studies  on this  with different
results see also Nichols 2002, p. 22; Strandberg
& Björklund 2013, p. 325; Björnsson et al. 2014,
p. 16).
These studies can answer the first question
regarding our concept of moral judgments. But,
as  Prinz rightly  points  out,  people  could  be
wrong (Prinz this collection, p. 10). These stud-
ies  do not tell  us anything about the subject
matter.  This is a further point Tresan makes.
He argues that even if we have internalist intu-
itions this is not enough to support internalism.
He argues that strength in modality is not in-
teresting for a substantial theory of moral opin-
ions. A claim with strong modality doesn’t tell
us more about the subject of the claim than the
same claim without it. That, necessarily, bachel-
ors  are  unmarried  (de  dicto)  tells  us  nothing
more than that they need to be unmarried to be
called bachelors. It’s a claim about our concept
“bachelor”. It tells us simply that the subjects
are  unmarried—the  same  as  this  exact  claim
without modality tells us. But if bachelors were
necessarily unmarried (de re) this would be bad
news for the subjects and would tell us some-
thing substantial about them—that they’re es-
sentially unmarried, that they, the individuals,
are  unable  to  be  married.  He  concludes  that
“[i]f we are interested in the nature of the Sub-
ject Matter, we must look to Relation not Mod-
ality” (Tresan 2009, p. 57; emphasis in original).
Only an internalist claim with a strong re-
lation  is  interesting.  But  Tresan  thinks  that
there are no arguments for a de re-internalism,
which would tell us something interesting and
substantial about the subject matter. A  de re-
internalism  that  states  a  strong  Relation  is
wrong. This is because our intuitions regarding
moral judgments and motivation can only sup-
port a de dicto internalism (Tresan 2009, p. 64).
And traditional arguments for internalism pro-
voke only such intuitions.
I think it is clear that Tresan misses one
important  possible  source  of  evidence  for  a
strong relation: empirical evidence. Here lies the
connection to Prinz’s work. The empirical find-
ings, which he collected, all point to a strong re-
lation  between  moral  judgment  and  affective
states. I take Prinz to be looking for a strong
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Relation when he says that emotions are an “es-
sential component” of moral judgments (Prinz
this collection, p. 12).
What I have tried to show here is the fol-
lowing.  Prinz  raises  a  potential  objection
against  his  own  sentimentalism:  the  relation
between  moral  judgments  and  emotions  lack
modal strength. He answers by saying that we
have enough evidence to conclude their neces-
sary connection. I argued that this is not a sat-
isfying answer because it misses the core of the
objection.
I think the evidence that he has collected
points to a strong Relation between moral judg-
ments  and  affective  (motivational)  states.
Therefore  Prinz  has  an  answer  to  objections
that call this strong relation into question. But
this is not an answer to an objection that oper-
ates  with  a  de  dicto internalism.  Underlying
these objections is an opposition to methodolo-
gical naturalism in general. Antti Kauppinen is
one example of  someone holding this  position
(2008,  p.  4).  Kauppinen  does  not  think  we
should ask what moral judgments  actually are.
In his view, metaethics is concerned with what
moral judgments necessarily are. “This takes us
from the realm of the actual to the realm of the
metaphysical or conceptually possible, and thus
beyond  the  empirical  and  the  observable”
(Kauppinen 2008, p. 22).
The evidence  that  Prinz  presents  in  the
target paper doesn’t suffice to refute this posi-
tion. But I hope to have shown that this need
not be a cause of concern for Prinz, because this
kind of necessity takes us away from the subject
matter. At the heart of Prinz’s account lies an
interest in moral judgments as a natural phe-
nomenon  that  we  should  study  by  empirical
means.
Adina Roskies, on the other hand, is sym-
pathetic  to  empirical  philosophy.  One  of  her
aims in the internalist–externalist debate was to
show that “[...] moral philosophy need not be,
and perhaps ought not be, exclusively a priori”
(Roskies 2003, p. 2003).
But this is in contrast to her understand-
ing of the required modality of the internalist
claim, as I tried to show using Tresan’s analysis.
If we want to clarify those kinds of debates em-
pirically, it’s not enough to just take traditional
philosophical  claims  and  look  for  evidence  in
their favor or evidence that can refute them. We
have to formulate them as a posteriori synthetic
claims  that  are  part  of  a  bigger  explanatory
project (Björnsson 2002, p. 329).
I  hope that this can shed more light on
the  implications  of  naturalistic  metaethics  for
philosophical  claims.  They  shouldn’t  be  re-
garded as conceptual a priori claims, but as hy-
potheses that need empirical confirmation. Nat-
uralistic metaethics is not concerned with a pri-
ori  conceptual  necessities.  It  requires  revising
our concepts when they don’t fit into the best
theories.  In  that  sense  empirical  philosophers
should  be  revisionists  (see  Francén 2010,  pp.
137 and 142 for a more detailed account of revi-
sionism).
Before I go on, I  want to offer  one last
thought about this. What might be the motiva-
tion for framing these positions as claims about
conceptual necessity? Roskies writes:
I take it that internalist philosophers have
intended to offer something stronger than
contingent claims about human wiring (...)
Only a view involving necessity or intrins-
icality  can  distinguish  moral  beliefs  and
judgments from other types by their spe-
cial content. (2008, p. 193)
But why do we need a priori conceptual neces-
sities  to  distinguish  between different  kind  of
beliefs and judgments? We could start with very
simple observations. Apparently people play a
game of blaming and blessing: they use words
like “good” and “bad” that are somehow differ-
ent than other terms. The task of defining what
morality is  could be a descriptive anthropolo-
gical enterprise. And I think this is in the spirit
of naturalistic metaethics.
I have argued that it is enough for Prinz’s
sentimentalism (and for internalism) to claim a
strong Relation between moral judgments and
emotions. But what kind of Relation is strong
enough for it? A mere statistical connection is
surely not enough. If the important part of the
sentimentalist thesis is not the Modality of the
whole claim, we have to analyze the terms “ne-
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cessary”  and  “essential”  in  a  non-modal  way.
One possibility,  that harmonizes with natural-
ized metaethics, is to regard this connection as
functional.5
In the next, and final, section I shall look
at  Prinz’s  critique  of  non-cognitivism.  I  shall
present  a  speculative  alternative  to  his  view
that I hope, again, is in agreement with his pro-
posal for a naturalized metaethics.
3 Defending non-cognitivism as an 
empirical theory
Here, I  want to argue against Prinz’s attack
on non-cognitivism. He thinks that there are
good empirical reasons to reject non-cognitiv-
ism. His first argument is that cognitivism can
predict  the  surface  form  of  moral  language
better  than  non-cognitivism.  First,  I  argue
against this by pointing to non-cognitivist ac-
counts of moral language that I think can pre-
dict  this  surface  form.  Second,  I  provide  a
speculative  non-cognitivist  theory  of  why
moral  language has the surface form we can
observe.  Again,  I  think  my  proposal  is  in
agreement  with  Prinz’s  naturalized
metaethics. I do think, however, that it chal-
lenges him to explore the space of possible ac-
counts.  My proposal shows, I hope, that the
empirical  evidence  cannot,  at  this  point,  de-
cide this question.
The  second  question  in  Prinz’s  decision
tree  is  whether  or  not  moral  judgments  are
truth-apt. Can they be true or false? Theories
that answer yes to this question are cognitiv-
istic, while theories that answer negatively are
non-cognitivistic. Non-cognitivism is a collective
term that can refer to many different theories
(Shafer-Landau 2003, p. 17). It consists of two
theses (Roojen 2013, section 1.1): the first says
that moral utterances do not express proposi-
tions; they’re not truth apt. This is a semantic
thesis about moral language. The second thesis
says that moral beliefs are not representational.
They  do  not  refer  to  anything  in  the  world.
This is a thesis about the mental state of the
5 For this proposal see Björnsson & Francén Olinder (2013) and Bedke
(2009) and Schulte (2012). They detail the idea that we can think of
this relation as teleo-functionalistic.
moral agent. Here Prinz wants to defend cognit-
ivism by providing empirically-informed reasons
to reject non-cognitivism. He defines expressiv-
ism in the following way (we can think of Ex-
pressivism  as  one  form of  the  first,  semantic
thesis of non-cognitivism):
Expressivism =Df Moral assertions express
mere  feelings  or  non-assertoric  attitudes,
and do not purport to convey facts. (Prinz
this collection, p. 7)
Prinz denies both of the two theses that make
up  non-cognitivism.  He  argues  that  the  most
obvious empirical prediction of non-cognitivism
fails, as he thinks that if non-cognitivism was
true  we  would  expect  our  moral  language  to
have a non-cognitive form (Prinz this collection,
p. 16). But this is not the case. It seems that
our moral language mostly has declarative form.
If this is correct, and if I don’t have reasons
to disbelieve it, does it mean that non-cognitivism
makes wrong predictions? I don’t think this is the
case. Much of the work in non-cognitivism is ded-
icated to explaining this apparent tension. But I
don’t think that this involves “elaborate logics”,
as  Prinz  puts it (this collection, p. 16). Rather,
most non-cognitivists provide theories about the
nature  of  moral  discourse  that  show  that  we
should expect the surface grammar to be declar-
ative. I don’t think that non-cognitivism has or
needs  to  have  these  “obvious  empirical  predic-
tions”.
The starting point is to look at the way
language is used. It is not the literal meaning of
ethical terms that are of interest but their func-
tion (Björnsson 2002, p. 328). Expressivism en-
tails a pragmatist theory of moral language:
[T]he pragmatist attempts to describe the
function  that  a  word,  phrase  or  concept
plays in human life, and once he has satis-
fied his curiosity there, he does not think
that there are any further questions to ask
about  utterances  of  that  sort.  (Smyth
2014, p. 608)
Arguably, such a pragmatist  view is  easier  to
naturalize because we have the social sciences,
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which offer large toolboxes for investigating hu-
man practices.
Although Prinz’s definition of expressivism
may be at the heart of non-cognitivism, in most
cases this is not the whole story. According to
expressivism, moral terms are not only used to
express ones attitudes but also to provoke cer-
tain attitudes in the hearer. This idea goes back
to the early emotivists. The “dynamic use” of
language (Stevenson 1937,  p. 21) involves the
manipulation of others: “[E]thical terms are in-
struments used in the complicated interplay and
readjustment  of  human  interests”  (Stevenson
1937, p. 20; emphasis in original).
Stevenson, and many others following him,
analyze expressions like “x is good” as meaning
“Hooray for x! Do hooray as well!” (Stevenson
1937, p. 25).6 It expresses the speakers attitude
and the wish or the prescription that the hearer
should adopt this attitude as well.
At  this  point  Prinz  could  reiterate  his
point  and simply ask:  “Why then do we say
‘this  is  good’  and  not  ‘I  like  this,  do  so  as
well’?” Here I want to offer a speculative an-
swer: because we don’t like to be manipulated.
If the function of moral language is, at least in
part, to influence the attitudes and the behavior
of others, I think we should expect it to take
this form. This is because a declarative sentence
has more authority than a mere expressive one.
If I want someone to do something it is argu-
ably more effective to disguise it in non-subject-
ive form, to give it the appeal of a truth-apt-
ness.7 I want to disguise it so that it will serve
this persuasive purpose.
I don’t want to say that these ideas are
correct. But they’re plausible theories that pre-
dict  the  surface  form of  moral  language,  and
which are no worse than cognitivistic theories.
Expressivism focuses  on what people  do  with
language. It focuses on the speech act, not the
literal  meaning.  Whether  people  express,  de-
clare, prescribe, describe, recommend, or evalu-
ate is nothing we can easily read from the sur-
6 Stevenson (1937, p. 25) writes: “I do like this; do so as well!” But the
first part looks suspiciously descriptive. Because this doesn’t fit with
Stevenson’s account, I reformulated it in this way.
7 Mackie discusses this instrumental use when he discusses why people
give their moral judgments the appeal of objectivity (1990, p. 42).
But as we saw, Prinz thinks this premise is wrong.
face form. But this is what Prinz seems to pre-
suppose when he says the most obvious empir-
ical  prediction fails.  We have to look at their
behavior  and the  pragmatic  context  in  which
the discourse happens.
I  argue  that  this  fits  even  better  with
Prinz’s  project  of  a  naturalized  metaethics.
When  Prinz discusses the last step in the de-
cision tree,  he writes:  “Naturalizing relativism
will require the marriage of cultural anthropo-
logy  and  sociolinguistics”  (this  collection,  p.
24). I think this marriage could be more helpful
at an earlier stage in the decision tree—to help
answer  the  question  of  whether  or  not  moral
terms aim at truth.
4 Conclusion
In this commentary on Prinz’s highly interest-
ing  and  substantial  target  paper  I  welcomed
his methodological naturalism, but argued that
his project is not as conciliatory between tradi-
tional  analytical  philosophy  and  naturalized
philosophy as he seems to think. The reason is
that on closer scrutiny we find opposing views
on the methodology and purpose of philosophy.
In the second part of my contribution I looked
at an objection against Prinz’s sentimentalism.
I argued, first, that he misses the real core of
this  kind  of  objections.  Then  I  used  Jon
Tresan’s distinction between  de dicto- and  de
re-internalism as a conceptual tool to propose
and develop another answer that Prinz could
use  against  this  objection.  In  particular,  I
claimed that, given Prinz’s metaethical natur-
alism, we should not look for conceptual neces-
sity but for fruitful hypotheses which we can
test in a posteriori. In the third and last part I
argued against Prinz’s critique of non-cognitiv-
ism. Prinz thinks that the most obvious empir-
ical prediction of non-cognitivism fails. Here, I
tried  to  demonstrate  how  non-cognitivism,
given  a  pragmatical  view  of  moral  language,
actually predicts the surface grammar of moral
discourse as well as cognitivistic alternatives. I
proposed a speculative explanation for this in-
teresting fact. This kind of explanation, I be-
lieve, fits even better with Prinz’s project of a
naturalized metaethics.
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